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Of Forgery,
Ancient and Modern

Manfredi Piccolomini

What is the difference between an essentially exact duplicate-more commonly called forgery-made in recent years of a
fifteenth-century Italian painting representing a Madonna with
Child, and a replica of a twentieth-century "readymade"-say,
for example, Marcel Duchamp's Bottle Rack-also reproduced in
present times? There is no simple answer to this question . The
issue of forgery lies ·in the individual perception of the beholder.
Let us start our analysis by imagining one of the many
nineteenth-century English or American art connoisseurs who
went to Italy for the purpose of acquiring old-master paintings to
be sold at a substantial profit to museums or private collectors at
home . The connoisseur would visit country churches in Tuscany
or Umbria in search of valuable Italian works and, upon finding,
for example, the altarpiece of a small Romanesque church, would
try to meet and befriend the parish priest . The priest, most likely
a naive country priest, deferential to the art-loving and sophisticated foreigner and certainly not aware of the developing international interest in early Italian art, would probably give away the
painting in exchange for some money presented to him as a philanthropic donation to the church. The connoisseur would also offer
to replace the work of art with another one, exactly alike, made by
a contemporary "artist." He would clearly not mention the fact
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that the "artist" in question went under the more common name
of forger.
The priest would accept the offer happily, considering it
highly advantageous to the parish. Nothing would be lost, and
finally an improvement in the dilapidated church would be possible. As for the painting, the priest would not think of it as having
an artisticvalue, only a religiousone, as the object of daily worship.
An exact reproduction would therefore make no difference. The
congregation would not even notice it. The connoisseur, for his
part, would perceive the matter quite differently. He would be
able to acquire what he considers an artistic masterpiece in exchange for a little cash and a cheap imitation. One of those imitations that have by now become famous, concocted by one of the
many art forgers who found a vast and growing market for their
productions beginning during the mid-nineteenth century.
Let us now bring our nineteenth-century connoisseur to a
major Italian city like Florence, placing him in contact with a
member of a fading aristocracy who nevertheless still owns one
or two portraits of his ancestors by Bronzino. Here too the connoisseur would offer some money and an exact, newly made replacement for the painting. Finding some use for the money, the owner
would also greedily accept it. This situation is, however, radically
different from the preceding one. In this case the seller knew well
that the portrait was made by a leading artist and that his ancestors
had paid a substantial sum for the commission. He knew well
that the replacement accepted in exchange, regardless of the exactitude of execution, was not the original work by Bronzino. In
accepting the deal he accepted the forgery, and was bound to pass
on the fraud to members of his family and to his friends.
From the two completely imagined but nevertheless representative examples of the way in which Italy lost so much of its art
during the past century to foreign collections, one thing should be
clear: the ideaof fake depends,in thefirst place,on culturaland historical
conditions. The priest, while understanding that his replacement
painting was an imitation, did not associate with it the fraudulent
and deceptive aspects that make up the quintessential nature of
the fake. The awareness of having accepted a fraudulent deal instead would, or should, haunt the complying aristocrat for the
rest of his life.
Let us now move to a more modern aspect of the fake, and
see what happens to art forgery in modern times.
In 1914 Marcel Duchamp took a few objects from daily life
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such as a bicycle which he promptly fastened for no logical reason
to a kitchen stool, or a bottle rack of the type used in French
wineries to dry wine bottles, signed them and claimed them as
works of art. For many good reasons the art establishment did
not call Duchamp's bluff, and in this way, almost as if by magic, an
ordinary bottle rack became Marcel Duchamp's Bottle Rack. Today
it enjoys the renown and the popularity of some of the greatest
art works of all times. With the Bottle Rack was born one of the
great artistic movements of our century, that of the "readymade."
In the 1960s, when Duchamp was enjoying the height of his
celebrity as the guru of the twentieth-century avant-garde, the
Milanese art dealer Arturo Schwarz finally called his bluff.
Schwarz had several sets of the "readymades" forged (but is it
possible to forge an industrial object?), asked Duchamp to sign
them, and put each set up for sale at $25,000! Duchamp was
amused by the game, complied with the signing, and enjoyed the
hefty revenues, saying he had done nothing to earn them! He
had, however, become the forger of himself.
Let us finally suppose that I, the author of this article, travelling through France during the summer long after Duchamp's
death, find a bottle rack just like his, buy it for a few dollars, and
then try to sell it as a work of art. Would I be selling a fake? Would
the object be more of a fake if I said that I was selling Duchamp's
Bottle Rack rather than just a bottle rack? What if I forged
Duchamp's signature on it? After all, Duchamp did not "make"
the original Bottle Rack. He bought it in a store just as I do.
There seems to be a substantial difference between the fake
of an old-master painting such as a Renaissance Madonna with
Child and that of a modern work such as Duchamp's readymade.
In the case of the readymade, Schwarz' "fake" or my "fake" are not
anymore "fakes" than Duchamp's piece. In terms of an industrial
object there is no real original.As in Plato's theory of the arts, the
originalnever lies in the object but in the idea, and there can never
be a perfect rendition of the idea. Duchamp's Bottle Rack is just
as good as mine, whether it is signed or not, and my bottle rack
is just as good as Schwarz'. What Duchamp has over Schwarz
and me is that he had the originalideaof transforming an ordinary
bottle rack into a piece of art. But insofar as the object in itself is
concerned, any bottle rack would do just fine. The originality is
in the mental process that leads to the nemesis of the ordinary
piece and transforms it into a work of art.
I must add that this definition is only true in theory. In the
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real world of art made up of art dealers and museum curators,
collectors and huge tax breaks for art donations, there is obviously
an interest in preserving the originality of any object considered
to be a work of art, be it a Renaissance painting or an industrial
object. The law of supply and demand teaches that prices rise in
inverse proportion to the availability of the object. There cannot
be too many bottle racks each worth several hundred thousands
of dollars. The marketplace's invisible hand protects itself by
championing hairsplitting discussions and Sherlock Holmes-like
investigations to distinguish the "good" bottle rack from the "bad"
one, the one worth a fortune from the one worth only a few
dollars. But such discussions do not take into consideration that
the only difference between the two objects lies in the reality of
Duchamp's eye and hand!
It is an ironic and paradoxical close to this discussion on
Duchamp that the first, and, as it were, "original," Bottle Rack
signed by the artist in 1914 has been lost. The only existing bottle
racks are "replicas"!
In the case of our old-master painting, be it a Madonna with
Child or a Bronzino, originality rests in the artifact and not in the
idea. Both the Madonna and Child and the portrait are ancient
and traditional tropes painted by many artists through the centuries. One artist rather than another receives a commission to
paint a work in one of these generic areas because his style, his
special hand is in demand. To forge the work of an old master is
always a long and often imperfect process during which the forger
immerses himself in the old master's times and carefully studies
all of his stylistic details. In composition, anatomy, color and other
features, each great master exercises his individual style, and a
successful forger has to imitate all of these particulars to the best
of his ability. Modern connoisseurship of old masters, starting
with Bernard Berenson and Roberto Longhi, consists in the careful
study of these details, and it is often said that a successful forger
always works according to the advice of a good connoisseur . Connoisseurs are also those who, by pointing out some "mistake" in
the painting, are able to uncover the forgery.
And what about the personality of the forger? Who is he?
How and why does he come to do what he does? Very little is
known about forgers. They are surrounded by an almost sacred
aura of mystery. We know for a fact that there were, and probably
still are, many of them. We know that starting with the second half
of the nineteenth century a substantial market developed for their
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talents, especially in Florence and Siena, the birthplaces of Italian
art. But it is extremely difficult to do research on them. Even art
historians who have a special eye for detecting fakes and who
often write and discuss the theory and history of forgery-Federico
Zeri is the first one to come to mind-are very careful never to
mention names. They glide over the subject by saying that the
proper name is irrelevant to the issue of forgery or, more simply,
that they cannot remember it. There are legal entanglements in
naming forgers and even I, who am not an art historian, prefer
to avoid mentioning the names of the one or two I know. One
always fears that naming names may open a can of worms ....
The forger's personality is therefore by-and-large only matter
for speculation. Obviously money is the most important motivation for a forger since fame, the other great stimulator of human
activity, is forbidden to him by the very nature of his work. The
opportunity to compete in disguise with the greatest artists of all
times is probably another great side benefit since the ability to
make one's own work pass, say, for a Raphael or a Michelangelo,
must provide some satisfaction. On the other hand, the faker is
protected by anonymity in the case of failure. But there is surely
another very interesting dimension to the forger's work which
needs to be analyzed from the psychological point of view . Obviously a very talented artist in his own right, at least from the
technical point of view, the forger freely chooses to annihilate his
own artistic persona in order to duplicate that of others. Insecurity
about his material well-being and low self-esteem involving the
real worth of his talents compel him to imitate others' talents
rather than promote his own. By doing so he is protected from
official failure while still having the opportunity to enjoy fame
vicariously, although in solitude, whenever his artifact succeeds in
passing as the artifact of someone else. Like Woody Allen's Zelig,
the art forger is the quintessential chameleon, the one who prefers
to excel through others rather than to make his own personal individualized statement. If one were to accept classical paradigm of
art as mimesis, then it would be easy to define the forgery as the
imitation, albeit the fraudulent imitation, of the imitation.
In more recent times, as things seem to have become much
more complicated, the definition of forgery is a good deal more
elusive. During the twentieth century, both artists like Duchamp
and critics have shown a great interest in the theory and the
practice of forgery, probably because through an understanding
of the phenomenon one can reach interesting conclusions about
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some of the artistic developments of our times . In a well-known
and much quoted article written in the mid-1930s, "The Work of
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," Walter Benjamin
tries to come to terms with the fact that because of the development
of new artistic media, such as photography and cinema, as well
as improvements in lithography, a work of art can be reproduced
almost infinitely. Seemingly unable to explain what has happened
to the originalunder these new conditions and incapable of retrieving from the sea of unlimited reproducibility the baffling realthing,
Benjamin states that in our time "the distinction between author
and public is about to lose its basic character." 1 Confronting the
same subject more directly from the point of authorship in a wellknown short story, "Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote," Jorge
Luis Borges imagines a twentieth-century author who set out to rewrite Cervantes. In describing Menard's intentions, Borges writes:
He did not want to compose another Quixote-which is easy-but
the Quixote itself. Needless to say, he never contemplated a mechanical transcription of the original: he did not propose to copy it. His
admirable intent ion was to produce a few pages which would coincide-word for word and line for line-with those of Miguel de
Cervantes .2

As the story progresses, Menard succeeds in his initial goal,
producing without copying a few chapters which coincide word
for word with the text of Cervantes. "Cervantes' text and Menard's
are verbally identical," says Borges, "but the second is almost
infinitely richer. "3
What is this added richness of the copy-which-is-not-a-copy?
Obviously, the production of a Golden Age style and of Golden
Age narrative structures in our time has quite a different meaning
in terms of irony and parody than if the same work had been
composed in its original century. The added richness of the contemporary version lies in the fact that while preserving all the
characteristics of the Renaissance one, it also adds elements such as
parody which are the result of literary and historical anachronism .
The main focus of Borges' s story is not to point out the differences
between two supposedly identical works of literature composed
in different centuries, but, again, to take up his own personal war
against the battered concepts of authorshipand originality. Because
Menard did not copy Cervantes' work, his Quixote is as much an
originalas Cervantes' Quixote, the one everyone generally accepts
as the only possible original.
The crucial innovations which have occurred in all the arts
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during the twentieth century have all carried with them attacks on
notions of authorship and originality. In his first Futurist Manifesto
of 1909, Filippo Tommaso Marinetti maintained that "a roaring
automobile, which seems to run on shrapnel, is more beautiful
than the Nike of Samothrace."4 Thus, anticipating Duchamp, and
Andy Warhol's Pop Art, he proposed an artistic role for industrial
products or "readymades." While Marinetti permitted the followers of his movement to deposit a bunch of flowers before
Leonardo's Giocondaonly once every year, he claimed that "to
admire an old master painting is equivalent to pouring our sensibility into a funerary urn rather than projecting it far away, through
violent creative sparkles of invention and action. " 5 Innovation
was to take the place of tradition. Marinetti wrote that "the great
Parisian tailors who by the fast invention of new fashions create
a passion for the new and hatred for what has already been seen"
were among those "possessed by divine forces. "6
Most important though, Marinetti proposed the abolition of
the artist's "I," of his individuality, in the work of art. He contended that the role of the artist was to bring reality into the work of
art rather than infusing it with his own subjective point of view. 7
Tristan Tzara picked up on this point in 1922 while theorizing the
artistic principles of the Dada movement:
Art has not the celestial and universal value that people like to
attribute to it. Life is far more interesting. Dada knows the correct
measure that should be given to art: with subtle, perfidious
methods, Dada introduces it into daily life. And vice versa. 8

It is interesting to note that exactly one year earlier (1921), in
one of the greatest plays of the century, Six Charactersin Searchof
an Author, Luigi Pirandello represented his characters as they rebel
against their author-director because he tries to make them act
and do things according to his personal artistic vision. The six
characters claim to know their drama better than the director and
they want the freedom to act it out as they know it.
Reality triumphs over art. The original is no longer in the
artist-whether
we speak of plot, painting or musical score-but
it belongs to the world itself.
This paradox was brought to its furthest limit by a contemporary
musician who in 1952 composed a "silent piece." In a performance
of John Cage's 4'33" (the title indicates the length of the piece), the
audience is exposed to a performer who walks on stage and sits in
front of his piano without playing. For four minutes and thirty-three
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seconds the audience witnesses a totally silent musical composition!
But as complete silence is obviously an impossibility, the audience
in fact hears noises that inevitably occur in any circumstance. More
particularly, if the performance takes place outdoors there will be
foreign noises and sounds intruding, such as birds singing or the
wind blowing through the branches of trees. These foreign and
unexpected noises were Cage's goals in 4'33". Rather than imposing
his own musical sounds, his own individual musical preferences on
the audience, Cage wanted the audience to become aware of sounds
that are created naturally and by chance in the environment. Commenting on this work, the composer said:
I wanted my work to be free of my own likes and dislikes, because
I think music should be free of the feelings and ideas of the composer.
I have felt and hoped to have led other people to feel that the sounds
of their environment constitute a music which is more interesting
than the music which they would hear if they went into a concert hall. 9

Thus in Cage's radical musical statement, the originalityof the work
is transferred from the work itself and the personality of its composer
to the surrounding world and to chance. The best condition for the
artist in our time, Cage seems to say, is to disappear as an artist!
Pop artists have been especially attentive to the theme of forgery
in the past thirty or so years. By "forging" boxes of Brillo Soap Pads,
Andy Warhol set the art world afire in the 1960s. And painting
symbols such as the American flag, dart targets and numbers, Jasper
Johns based his art on the reproduction of things which are nothing
in themselves. What is the difference between painting a symbol,
imitating it, or simply forging it? In his recent Four Seasonsseries
exhibited at the 1988 Venice Biennale, Johns carries his symbolist
theory to the point of infusing the work with an image that refers
to Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of the multiple and undefinable
meanings of images. The image of the head of a duck which can
also be seen as the head of a rabbit, a problem that takes up many
pages in Wittgenstein's PhilosophicalInvestigations,10 makes its
emblematic appearance in the Spring painting of the Four Seasons
opposite a trick vase, the sides of which form profiles of Queen
Elizabeth and Prince Philip. Everything becomes something else;
everything is a decoy. And once a decoy is painted and reduced to
a flat surface, how does it differ from the "real thing" it fraudulently
claims to represent?
Probably the most compelling artistic exercise in forgery of
our times is that of J. S. G. Boggs, a fairly unknown artist until two
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years ago when his arrest and trial on charges of counterfeiting
currency bills made him a celebrity almost overnight. By forging
money Boggs strikes at the heart of one of the most inviolable
and sacred symbols of our times. This is his scheme: Boggs draws
a perfect reproduction-his
forgeries are said to be unrecognizable
from a slight distance-of a Treasury note, say a $100 bill, on only
one side of an accurately dimensioned piece of paper. He reserves
the reverse side for his signature and other relevant information.
Then Boggs tries to buy something with the note. He tells the
seller that the bill is his own drawing, but that to accept the paper
is to accept the value arbitrarily assigned to it. The forged bill
must be accepted for $100 and if the products Boggs buys are
worth $95, he must receive $5 in change. Boggs also demands a
written receipt for his purchase. Following this transaction, Boggs
sells the real $5 bill obtained in change and the receipt to one of
his collectors for several hundred dollars. He also gives the collector some clues as to who owns the forged $100 bill. It is up to the
collector to contact the merchant and to acquire the forged bill,
which at this point usually sells for a lot more than the value
drawn on its face. This act completes the artistic process: a work
of art is made of the forged bill, the receipt and the real bill
obtained in change. These three items are then hung in galleries
and sold for several thousand dollars.
Some of these counterfeited bills hanging in a London gallery
were confiscated by Scotland Yard in 1986 and led to Boggs' trial for
counterfeiting without the prior consent of the Bank of England.
Although Boggs risked a severe sentence, he was found not guilty
by the jury. Some of the jurors admired the work and became
fascinated by the idea behind it. In an interview, his lawyer said:
A banknote represents value, and a Boggs does not, though it has
value. Boggs does nothing to resolve the category confusion, because it is the very process of his art to mystify, to obscure the
distinction. But surely it is the function of the law to recognize and
proclaim such obvious category distinctions. 11

It is again interesting to emphasize that Boggs' troubles were
caused by concerns arising from the marketplace and from the
authorities" implicit responsibility to curb any scheme, however
innocuous, that could threaten accepted social values regarding
material entities. A fake is a fake especially if it constitutes a
hazard, real or imagined, to the established value system.
In a similar literary experiment, several years ago the English
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novelist Doris Lessing seemed to confirm that originality and authorship are a primary marketplace need. Lessing wrote a novel,
The Diary of a GoodNeighbour,under an assumed name and asked
her agent to submit it to publishers as the work of a beginning
writer. Lessing' s two long-standing British publishers turned
down the work of the supposedly unknown beginner, demonstrating the revenue valve of the author over the work. 12
We have come a long way from our nineteenth-century forger
of old-master paintings who works in hiding and fears any publicity, to Boggs who, aside from being proud of his forgeries,
assumes that they will be sold at a price much higher than their
original value as monetary units. What happened in between? Is
modern art different from classical art? Has art changed?
It is very difficult to give one definite answer to this question
because diverse theories of the arts abound, and especially because
art, at its best, always eludes and transcends theory. The difficulty
is even greater with modern art because it has made ambiguity,
as Boggs' attorney properly pointed out, one of its frimary concerns. However, if indeed as Arthur Danto claims, 1 modern art
tends to blur the distinction between art and life by centering on
the ordinary rather than the exceptional, then we must conclude
that the issue of originality is no longer relevant to an understanding of art as it might be in the case of an old-master painting. The
visual and tactile aspects impressed on the work by the artist's
individuality are no longer in question. Modern art is conceptual
rather than ocular, it speaks to the mind rather than to the eye,
it is to be thought and not seen; it is, in one word, philosophical rather than perceptual. 14 The "hand" of the artist, his
"patte" (paw), as the French avant-garde artists of the beginning
of the century sarcastically called it, has practically disappeared.
It is not the image in itself and its "beauty" that count, but the
intellectual process that the image sets in motion. The lack of
originality characteristic of the readymades which shamelessly
flaunt a total absence of the "hand" is mentally much more stimulating because it challenges the boundaries of art with impending
non-art, thus questioning the very nature and legitimacy of art!
Finally the "real world," art's worst enemy! The "real world,"
the world of money and banks, the marketplace of art and of all
other things as well, does not seem to accept the total reproducibility of art or, for that purpose, of anything else. Not yet, at least.
If everything were totally reproducible-from works of art to $100
bills--the world would probably be total chaos. The marketplace
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tells the common man, if not Duchamp, that it is not enough to
imprint one's signature on an ordinary object to make it worth a
fortune. It tells us that we have to toil for our well-being, it reminds
us of our human condition. With the message it encodes in its
abolition of originality, modern art paradoxically does what all
great art has always done: It expands our horizons, it replaces
our daily concerns with spiritual inspiration. Maybe it describes
for us the Garden of Eden, that place of total availability which
rests well hidden in the subconscious.
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